General Patraeus, Success, and Some Reflections

Let me begin by acknowledging the intelligence of General Pratraeus. He has an earned Doctorate in International Relations; moreover; he surrounds himself with academics; two of his primary military advisors are full colonels, both are PhDs. His presentation before the House and Senate was and academic collection and analysis of the data. His preparation for his appearance before the Congress made that of the ambassador look mediocre. However; the pre-presentation hype accompanying Patraeus and his presentation lacked any consideration of the falibility of the general. To that end, I reveal a number of realities that any military careerist, past and present, are aware of, while the general American public is in the dark about.

Consider the overwhelming Senatorial support for the general's taking command of the Iraqi combat zone.

One of the qualifications/character traits that won Pratraeus favor with the U.S. Senate was his propensity for "straight talk" and "telling it like it is."

As a retired veteran of 22.5 years of military service with the U.S. Army, I must point out that experience informs me that U.S. Army officers do not become general officers on such a record.

Those who become general officers are "team players" who, regardless of the order or mission reply "yes sir," salute and carry out the order.

That said, the question becomes, at what point did General Pratraeus acquire this stalwart trait? And, like General Alexander Haig before him, Pratraeus jumped two stars in a two and one half year period, leaping over all of the three star generals in the U.S. Army.

Given excessively loud kudos, from some political corners, for what is happening in Al Anbar province, that is; getting the province's shiekdom to join his forces in pursuit of the destruction of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Two points should be noted here; first, it is a Marine Colonel who had developed the relationship between his troops and Sunni Shieks long before Patreaus landed in his present position and the successes, such as they are, have been attributed to him, second, a review of the history of early U.S. involvement in Afghanistan will inform us that the CIA was quick to flip the tribal leaders in the north of the country.

Regardless of who gets the credit for whatever "success" have been achieved, it is important that it continue. Whether or not the Al Anbar model can be applied outside of this province remains to be seen. I will have more to say on this subject in a future posting.

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the brotherman